three corps-commanders demanded full garrisons for the works south of the Potomac,—which according to Barnard and Barry would require 13,446 men,[1]—a sufficient number of troops to occupy the works on the north bank, say, 3000 men,[2] and a covering force of 25,000,—in all, 40,446 men. We are therefore clearly within bounds if we find 35,000 men to have been the number which General McClellan ought to have left solely for the defence of Washington.[1]

When we recall the unwillingness of the President to consent on any conditions to the removal of the army down Chesapeake Bay, and the solicitude* which he had always manifested for the safety of the Capital, and when we recognize the fact that the leaving of a sufficient garrison in and about Washington had been insisted on by the Government as a condition precedent to its sanction for the Peninsular campaign, it is certainly most difficult to understand why General McClellan should have put off attending to this matter to the last minute before his departure. Yet so it was. His letter to this Secretary of War, announcing the number and description, of the troops which he intended to leave for the defence of Washington, was not written until he was onboard the steamer *Commodore,* on the point of

starting for Fortress Monroe.[4]

[1] 5 W. R., 628. If the three corps-commanders adopted the view of Barnard and Barry that all these works did not require full garrisons, this number would be reduced to 8045, which would make the entire number 36,045,

[2] 5 W. R., 627.

[3] Generals Thomas and Hitchcock found that to carry out the requirements of the corps-commanders would take 55,000 men: 14 W. K., *tn.*

[4] 5 W. R., 60.